Yasha Sapir
Email: jsapir [at] usc [dot] edu
I'm a philosophy graduate student at the University of Southern California. My main research interests are in epistemology, decision theory, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and social philosophy.
Before USC, I was at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. And before that I was at Reed.
Teaching Experience
A summary of the courses I've taught.
Cherry-picked praise from students.
Publications
Inquiry and deception (with Brian Haas) [preprint]
Analysis (Forthcoming).
What is it to be deceived? Brian and I argue that victims of deception settle on a false answer to a question. Want to avoid being duped? Our proposal provides an answer: inquire further, don't settle.
Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry (with Peter van Elswyk) [preprint]
Synthese (2021).
Peter and I defend the ignorance norm, the view that interrogative attitudes (like wonder and curiosity) directed at a question are never compatible with knowledge of the question’s answer. We further argue that the ignorance norm is exhaustive: all epistemic positions not ruled out by the ignorance norm (like mere belief) directed at the answer to a question are compatible with having an interrogative attitude towards that question.
Works in Progress
How to build a pyramid with vague propositions. [Draft available]
When you learn something vague, your posteriors are sometimes pyramid-shaped. I provide a novel explanation for why this is, and I present a picture where though reality is not vague, propositions nonetheless can be.
When to inquire when you're not sure what you believe. [Draft available]
It's not always rational to gather free information before making a decision, even if learning is transparent. In particular, I prove the only condition on learning that guarantees that it's rational to learn more for free is the all or nothing condition: the condition where it's certain what you'll learn is either maximally informative or maximally uninformative.
Silent complicity and the influence constraint. [Draft available]
I defend the view that to be complicit in something you had to have been in a position to influence that thing, and I show how this principle can be reconciled with the thought that silence makes people complicit in a wide range of cases.
Ignorant complicity. [Draft available]
I go over two reasons to think complicity is subject to an epistemic condition – that to be complicit is to be to blame and that to be complicit is to have had a reason to do otherwise – and I show that both are no good.
The value of awareness (with June Lee-Rogers). [In preparation]
June and I propose a way of thinking about the practical value of inquiries where an agent becomes aware of new concepts. An upshot of our framework is awareness growth is not always practically valuable.
How to update when you're not sure what you believe. [In preparation]
I show that in settings where agents aren't sure what they believe, conditionalization doesn't maximize expected accuracy, even when learning is transparent. I further show that such settings complicate the accuracy-maximizing case for non-traditional update rules, too.